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Karl Löwith’s Meaning in History presents the emergence of modern philosophy of history as a 
secularization of medieval theology of history. His thesis holds that modern historical consciousness 
transposes into the immanent frame a constitutively transcendent element: the Christian history of 
salvation. In The Legitimacy of the Modern Age Hans Blumenberg impugns Löwith’s theory, by 
arguing that it works on the erroneous assumption that there would be a substantial content originally 
possessed by medieval Christianity and only later illegitimately appropriated by modernity. 
Blumenberg proposes that Löwith’s “transposition” hypothesis must be replaced by his own 
“reoccupation”: the modern vision of history would have thus taken up the place of Christian 
eschatology. This paper contends that Blumenberg fails to see that he and his opponent are arguing at 
different epistemological levels: while Blumenberg’s discussion operates at the level of the efficient 
causation of history, Löwith’s is focused on the philosophical root of the teleology of the modern idea 
of progress, which explains this notion as a transposition of the eschaton into a purely immanent telos. 
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En El sentido de la historia, Karl Löwith presenta el surgimiento de la filosofía moderna de la historia 
como una secularización de la teología de la historia medieval. Su tesis sostiene que la conciencia 
histórica moderna transpone a un marco inmanente un elemento constitutivamente trascendente: la 
historia cristiana de la salvación. En La legitimación de la Edad Moderna Hans Blumenberg impugna 
la teoría de Löwith, argumentando que ésta funciona basada en la suposición errónea de que habría 
un contenido sustancial, originalmente propiedad del cristianismo medieval y sólo después 





“transposición” de Löwith debe reemplazarse por su propia “reocupación”: la visión moderna de la 
historia habría pues tomado el lugar de la escatología cristiana. Este artículo argumenta que 
Blumenberg no logra ver que él y su adversario están razonando en diferentes niveles 
epistemológicos: mientras que el análisis de Blumenberg opera a nivel de la causa eficiente de la 
historia, el de Löwith se centra en la raíz filosófica de la teleología de la idea moderna de progreso, 
que explica esta noción como transposición del eschaton a un telos puramente inmanente.  
Löwith, Blumenberg, filosofía de la historia, secularización, trascendencia, inmanencia, eschaton. 
 
In his book Meaning in History, Karl Löwith carries out a genealogy of the modern 
idea of progress. Philosophy of history, Löwith claims, arises as a secularized version of 
theology of history, gradually evolving into a philosophical dogma. His well-known thesis 
presents modern historical consciousness as a secularization of the Christian idea of 
“salvation history” and, more precisely, of divine providence and eschatological finitude —
a connection that becomes clearer in the title for the German version: Weltgeschichte und 
Heilsgeschehen, literally meaning “world history and saving event”.1 
The first author to take issue with Meaning in History is Hans Blumenberg, who, 
in the First Part of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age,2 not only accuses Löwith of historical 
“substantialism,” but also rejects theories of secularization at large, thus taking to task also 
Carl Schmitt, Odo Marquard, Hermann Lübbe, Thomas Luckmann and Hans Georg 
Gadamer. Secularization, Blumenberg contends, became an overextended dogmatic 
category: most critics take it for granted, but no one manages to elucidate it. Blumenberg 
(1983) disparages secularization theory as a “category of historical wrong” (p. 1), serving 
the sole purpose of delegitimizing the modern age. An effective formula summarizes 
Blumenberg’s position, by stating that for secularization theories modernity is nothing but 
“the Middle Ages minus the faith in transcendence” (Greisch, 2004, p. 281).   
This paper does not render a detailed account of the Löwith-Blumenberg debate.3 
Instead, it proposes a reassessment of Löwith’s secularization thesis, by complementing his 
argument of Meaning in History with his review of Hans Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of 
the Modern Age. My central claim is that Blumenberg misrepresents Löwith’s secularization 
thesis and therefore, in allegedly refuting him, he is actually attacking a straw man. 
Blumenberg’s proton pseudos consists in assimilating Löwith’s “secularization” to the 
juridical model of expropriation: to be sure, an interpretation that is in accord with the 
 
1 The book was originally published in English in 1949 and the German version would come 4 years later, in 
1953. 
2 Blumenberg’s book was originally published in German as Die Legitimität der Neuzeit in 1966. 






historical origin of the term. Indeed, the term “secularization” has its origin in France. In the 
late 1500s we find this noun and its verbal form, secularize (séculariser) “meaning ‘the 
transfer of goods from the possession of the Church into that of the world’” (Bremmer, 2008, 
p. 433). In applying this interpretive model, however, Blumenberg distorts Löwith’s thesis 
as a case of historical substantialism, thus incurring in a reductionism that lays bare two 
suggestive assumptions of Blumenberg’s own argument: its marked apologetic purpose and, 
more importantly, its underlying materialism.  
In his account of the rise of modernity, Blumenberg subordinates interpretive 
analysis to legitimation, insofar as he makes the latter determine the former. As Löwith 
points out in his review of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Blumenberg undertakes —
even from the book’s epigraph, taken from Gide’s The Counterfeiters4— an apology of 
modernity, against the supposed injustice of its misinterpretation as the outcome of 
secularized Christian theology. Löwith (1968) argues that this fact gives away the book’s 
vindicating purpose, since Blumenberg not only attempts “to ‘understand’ the epochal 
character of modernity, but also to rightly assess it, judge it, evaluate it, and vindicate it 
against an alleged injustice” (pp. 195-196).   
In order to grasp the bias denounced by Löwith, we must turn to Blumenberg’s 
distinction between two very close —yet fundamentally different— uses of the term 
“secularization”. The first one designates the phenomenology or diagnose shared by most 
theoreticians: namely, that modernity brought about an increasingly irreligious, 
“secularized” world. As Blumenberg (1983) puts it: “the old lamenting confirmation that 
the world grows ever more worldly” (p. 16). The second use of the term, instead, refers to 
the explanation of how that state of affairs came about. Blumenberg therefore calls the first 
meaning of secularization “descriptive” and the second “explanatory” (pp. 3-4).  
Blumenberg’s distinction, however, remains incomplete if we overlook a level of 
analysis that remains unstated in his account and yet plays a determinant role in it. This third 
instance, I would argue, consists in the assessment of secularization, i.e. whether this process 
represents a positive or a negative development in the unfolding of history —Blumenberg 
only mentions the assessment of secularization a propos the paradoxically favorable 
judgment pronounced by Barth’s theology of separation (pp. 6-7). My point is that 
Blumenberg lets slip a tacit value judgment between the phenomenological description of 
secularization and his allegedly unbiased explanation. In fact, he claims that the validity 
ascribed to secularization theory should ensue the more fundamental question as to whether 
that theory is true: “How one assigns the values here is secondary compared to the question 
whether a relation of genetic dependence [between eschatology and the moving forward of 
 
4 The book’s motto reads: “It’s curious how one’s point of view changes according as one is the off-spring of 





history] […] would be justifiable” (p. 30). In Blumenberg’s own account, however, it is an 
a priori value judgment —“modernity is legitimate”— that determines the explanatory 
question —“how or why did modernity arise?”  
Blumenberg takes for granted that Löwith’s secularization theory stems from an 
indictment of the Modern Age as illegitimate, yet even if we could find traces of a 
pessimistic vision of modernity in Karl Löwith, the argument of Meaning in History unfolds 
independently of that allegedly negative premise. Indeed Löwith does not take issue with 
modernity per se, but with those theories that praise it as a radically original age, utterly 
emancipated from medieval categories. Such theories, he asserts, overlook the undeniable 
continuity of ideas from one historical period into the other.  
In his review Löwith points out that the verdict of legitimacy or illegitimacy is too 
restrictive when applied to developments in the history of ideas, since those categories 
cannot account for the transition from one epoch to another. The category of legitimacy or 
illegitimacy can only apply to “verifiable property relations” (Löwith, 1968, p. 201). 
Therefore, he argues, Blumenberg’s attempt to subordinate the emergence of modernity to 
its historical validity is a direct consequence of modeling secularization upon the idea of 
expropriation.  
In addition to the priority assigned to the question of legitimacy, Blumenberg’s 
misinterpretation of Löwith reveals another problematic assumption: Blumenberg is 
assertive that, once the idea of juristic “expropriation” dominates the inquiry, the search for 
a secularized “substance” prevails over all other question (pp. 23-24). In fact, Blumenberg 
considers “substantial identity” as the first of three principles that would make the talk of 
secularization valid —the other two being the primary ownership of the substance and its 
one-sided removal. Accordingly, Blumenberg seems so sure that Löwith’s theory relies on 
the positing of a substance, that his entire critique is aimed at proving the inexistence of 
such element. Here we encounter Blumenberg’s second inconsistency: on the one hand he 
accuses The Meaning of History of substantialism, on the other he demands proof of a 
secularized substance. In other words, Blumenberg contradicts himself when he demands 
evidence of that very principle, which he is intent on refuting. As Löwith (1983) puts it: 
“Since his historical consciousness rejects any substantial tradition or basic self-preserving 
features, yet at the same time constitutes these into a criterion of demonstrable 
secularization, the author charges his adversary with the burden of proof” (pp. 196-197). 
It is on this same ground that Blumenberg rejects Thomas Luckmann’s definition 
of secularization as “transformation” —rather than as “dissolution”— of traditional religion, 
claiming against him: 
For a usage defined in this way, what is called for is [...] evidence of transformation, 





endures throughout the process. Without such a substantial identity, no recoverable sense 
could be attached to the talk of conversion and transformation. (p. 16) 
It is therefore Blumenberg the one who falls into substantialism, when he assumes 
that the notion of transformation necessitates a hypothetical historical substance. What he 
fails to grasp is Löwith’s ontological connection between the Christian eschaton and the 
emergence of the modern historical telos, constrained as he is by his own empiricist demand. 
Thus, despite his claim to functionality, Blumenberg restricts real connections to the 
subcategory of material connections —detectable and identifiable as substantial realities. 
But the fundamental question remains whether or not Löwith’s idea of a causal nexus 
between the two instances really presupposes a “substance” enduring throughout the 
process. For if the answer to this question is negative, if Löwith’s idea does not rely on a 
substance that would undergo secularization, then his thesis could be perfectly compatible 
with a “functional” explanation.  
I would suggest that in Löwith’s usage, “transformation” simply denotes a certain 
alteration of an idea, taking place within a much broader frame of continuity. His main 
contention is that, despite the appearance of interruption, the emergence of the modern world 
out of the medieval should be understood as a modification of certain ideas, rather than as a 
radical break. Thus Löwith’s point is that an element essential to the medieval worldview, 
namely the notion of futurity contained in the hope of fulfillment at the end of history, 
persists in the modern age, albeit with a modified historical frame. But to support this claim, 
Löwith does not need to postulate a Platonic idea —let alone a “substance” with material—
like features like the one Blumenberg ascribes him. Rather, Löwith points out the 
expectation of a future consummation persistent in philosophies of history.   
Furthermore —and I consider this a decisive point— Löwith’s talk is not so much 
about “transformation” as it is about “transposition”: in the process of secularization an idea 
is transposed from the metaphysical frame of transcendence into one of pure immanence. 
That is why to Blumenberg’s objection that, whereas the Christian eschaton was 
transcendent, the modern telos is immanent, Löwith (1968) retorts that this is precisely what 
to “secularize” means —to render immanent what was transcendent. “Since what else should 
“secularization” [Säkularisierung] mean, if not precisely the possibility of secularizing 
[verweltlichen] an originally transcendent relational meaning into one that is immanent and 
thus of alienating its original meaning?” (p. 199). This connection is more clearly expressed 
in the German term verweltlichen, which denotes the act of “making worldly” —i.e. 
transposing into the world an expectation hitherto located beyond this world. 
As for Löwith’s alleged substantialism, it calls for a fundamental distinction. If the 





throughout history, then Löwith’s vision can certainly be denominated substantialist, since 
that could be considered one of the main insights of his book. If, however, substantialism 
implies postulating an ahistorical substantial content, unalterable in its reality as a platonic 
entity, a possession which, originally owned by Christianity, was later illegitimately usurped 
and distorted by the Modern Age, then Löwith is as far removed from this assertion as is 
Blumenberg from postulating that modernity simply arose ex nihilo. Because Blumenberg 
misses Löwith’s fundamental concern, he also misinterprets the leading argument of 
Meaning in History.  
Blumenberg claims having found the deepest motivations underlying Löwith’s 
secularization thesis: the yearning for the ancient reliance on cyclical cosmology and its 
assuredness that history recurred eternally. According to Blumenberg, this penchant leads 
Löwith to vindicate antiquity and depreciate both the Middle Ages and modernity. Thus, 
once ancient cosmology is abandoned, he goes on, for Löwith the whole notion of history is 
distorted and irretrievably lost. Thus Löwith’s chief purpose would be to “set up the 
renaissance of cyclical cosmology, as proclaimed by Nietzsche.” More, Blumenberg claims: 
“Seen from the point of view of secularization, the false conflict of the medieval and the 
modern can be reduced to the single episode of the interruption of the human connection to 
the cosmos” (p. 28). But, here again, he seems oblivious to the fact that Löwith’s criterion 
for drawing the watershed between visions of history is not their model of time-flow — 
whether cyclical or linear— but the way in which their inner elements cohere. Thus, Löwith 
accepts as valid conceptions of history both the ancient —as a conjunction of cyclical time 
and eternal recurrence— and the medieval —as a combination of linear time and finite 
history. The agreement between the two visions is no mere accident: precisely because they 
represent consistent models, they show awareness that history is neither the realm of 
ultimate meaning nor the instance of perfectibility by which the human could eradicate evil 
and attain happiness. By contrast, modern philosophy of history raises a double problem: 
not only does it mix incompatible elements —time linearity and infinitude— but, more 
questionably, it rests upon the expectation that human nature must progress toward 
perfection along the decisive instance of history. For Löwith (1969), this is how “the faith 
in the absolute relevance of the most relative history” (p. 32) comes about. 
Löwith considers the permanence of human nature as an undeniable fact and 
regards with skepticism any hint at its possible improvement in history. Otherwise put, he 
disparages as a modern mythology the idea according to which the human genre can evolve 
into new forms, defining the modern faith in history with a formula borrowed from Croce: 
“the ultimate religion of intellectuals,” and he goes even further, by stating: “The most trivial 
manifestation of the historical consciousness of contemporary man is the talk of the 
‘transition’ to a new age and the corresponding talk of the ‘man until now’ and ‘man of the 
future’” (Löwith, 1969, p. 11).  Precisely, he sets out to refute this modern illusion by 
drawing his readers to what he deems the sounder idea of a constant human essence, 





what he considers the excessive attention placed on the fluctuations of history and 
temporality, although he declares himself aware that modernity is characterized by this 
precise tendency (p. 8). In brief, we must understand Löwith’s rejection of modern 
philosophies of history as a rejoinder to the distinctively modern way of thinking, “obsessed 
with historical consciousness” (p. 16).5  
However, it is important to note that Löwith readily acknowledges the moving 
forward of science and social organization —especially in relation to technology— but 
disavows the progress of a hypostasized “humanity” in modern philosophies of history. 
Whereas both ancient cosmology and the Judeo-Christian vision of the world safeguarded 
the permanence of human nature —since neither one assigned meaning or value to history— 
modern philosophies conceive of human nature as morally and ontologically improvable. 
This tendency amounts to postulating a gradual eradication of evil from the world, since 
history ceases to be the realm of contingency to become the crucial instance where human 
destiny is at stake. The secular faith in progress culminates in the definitive step taken by 
Marx, from Hegelian dialectics to material praxis and the pursuit of happiness in the form 
of an earthly paradise: “Marx drew out the ultimate consequences of the Hegelian school’s 
historicism, by reducing the whole of nature to sheer material of the socio-historical forces 
of production” (Löwith, 1952, p. 239).6  
At this point a suggestive agreement between Löwith and Blumenberg comes to 
light: both see the idea of progress as a direct consequence of the modern turning away from 
transcendence. The point of contention comes up in their diverging accounts of that 
connection. Löwith defines it as one of continuity, moreover, of causation: the belief in 
transcendence is transposed into immanence, which results in the faith in progress 
characteristic of the modern philosophies of history. Blumenberg, for his part, although 
acknowledging the Middle Ages as the precondition for the rise of modernity, defines this 
link not as causality, but as mere occasion. Moreover, far from providing the ideological 
matrix for modernity, the late Middle Ages would have supplied the model against which 
the modern age reacted. Thus where Löwith finds continuity in the form of transposition, 
Blumenberg sees only interruption and opposition: Blumenbergian modernity embodies a 
brand new conception of the world, in no way indebted to Christianity.  
And yet the connection that Löwith traces between Middle Ages and modernity is 
closer to a functional question than to a substance. Not, however, a question that modernity 
would drag along as an undesirable burden or as an appendix alien to its own concerns, as 
Blumenberg seems to suggest, when he states that modern philosophy accepted the 
 
5 In this sense, see Barash’s explanation of Löwith’s politics as possibly influencing his views on history (Barash, 
1998, pp. 69-92). 





questions bequeathed to it as a challenge and points out: “It is not the autochthonous and 
spontaneous will to knowledge that drives reason to overexertion”. He even goes further to 
denounce that only in appearance had the Middle Ages answered those questions it passed 
on to the modern age: in reality, medieval questions “had only been posed precisely because 
people thought they already possessed the ‘answers’” (p. 48). Löwith, by contrast, regards 
those questions as the lasting inquiry into the meaning of human nature that could be 
characterized as quintessential to Western thought. To him, the history of philosophy, far 
from suggesting a permanent shift in worldviews, clearly attests to the striking continuity of 
Western thought in repeating and reformulating the same problems, “from Aristotle to Hegel 
and from Parmenides to Heidegger” (Löwith, 1952, pp. 237-238).  
To such questions, Löwith argues, the ancients answered with an ordered cosmos 
that moves cyclically and according to fate, Christians with eschatology and Creation, 
following linear movement and divine justice, and the moderns with a combination of those 
two models into one problematic scheme. In brief, when philosophers of history posit the 
perpetual evolution of human nature and the eradication of evil from the world, they are 
replacing both fate and divine providence with secular progress. 
This replacement, Blumenberg contends, should be understood not as transposition 
(Umsetzung), but rather as “reoccupation” (Umbesetzung).7 In other words, he proposes the 
permanence not of content, but of function. Yet again, the question is whether Blumenberg’s 
reoccupation is as different from Löwith’s transposition as the former would have it. 
Blumenberg’s opposition of his formal or functional explanation to Löwith’s allegedly 
material or substantialist thesis holds only if we interpret the latter —the way Blumenberg 
does— as a transference of a possession, as in the case of expropriated church property. But 
in reality Löwith’s theory follows a functional rationale, since it accounts for the basic 
problem behind both theology and philosophy of history: the existence of evil and suffering 
in this world and the wish to overcome it as an instauration of a perfect justice. Hardly could 
one dispute that this problem pervades Löwith’s entire book, from beginning to end. The 
epigraph, taken from a sermon of Augustine, compares the world to an oil-press under 
pressure: “If you are the dregs of the oil, you are carried away through the sewer; if you are 
genuine oil you will remain in the vessel. But to be under pressure is inevitable” (p. iv). In 
the conclusion of the book, Löwith wraps up the discussion as he denounces the confounding 
of: “the fundamental distinction between redemptive events and profane happenings, 
between Heilsgeschehen and Weltgeschichte” (p. 203). 
While they are both concerned with the emergence of the modern world out of the 
medieval, Löwith and Blumenberg are arguing at different levels —a fact that determines, 
in each case, a particular object and method. Löwith centers his analysis on the rise of 
modern philosophies of history and their fixation upon the idea of progress. Their essential 
element, he proposes, was the illusion of human improvement through history, a 
 





misconception that originated in the immanentization of a transcendent element: the 
Christian eschaton. Blumenberg, on the other hand, identifies as the salient feature of 
modernity the self-assertion of the human, which would have brought about progress in the 
sciences and the arts, an advancement ultimately extending to all aspects of social 
organization. This achievement he interprets as the definitive overcoming of Gnosticism, an 
overcoming more total and effective than the first one, which would have taken place in the 
Middle Ages.8  
It is also their different points of interest that entail divergent modes of explanation. 
Löwith offers a philosophical, ontological account, precisely because he is analyzing what 
he regards as a process saturated with ideas: the transposition of eschatology into an 
immanent frame. He intends to clarify the driving force behind modern visions of history, 
by tracing the metamorphosis of elements that, though altered, maintain conspicuous traces 
of their origin. Nowhere is this influence more apparent than in the reversal of historical 
interest from past events into the future, via Christian eschatology. Löwith (1952) argues 
that the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament as oriented toward the New Testament 
“introduced the idea of progress from something antiquated into something new, from 
something merely promised into a fulfillment and turned the progress into the future as the 
sustained pattern of historical understanding” (pp. 240-241).9 Löwith locates the rationale 
of these distinctively modern ways of understanding the world in their final cause or 
intention. The question he addresses could be stated thus: “What does philosophy of history 
aim at?” 
At the beginning of Meaning in History Löwith states the methodological 
assumption according to which his argument will proceed. Unlike the sciences, he explains, 
theology and philosophy pose questions that are empirically unanswerable, and this is 
precisely what constitutes their epistemological dignity: “All the ultimate questions 
concerning first and last things are of this character; they remain significant because no 
answer can silence them” (p. 3). And yet Löwith’s methodology is anything but aprioristic: 
pace Blumenberg, he takes as starting point the indisputable fact that modern philosophies 
of history —especially since the Enlightenment— are teleologically oriented toward an 
immanent fulfillment and that this fact betrays their dependence on the theology of history. 
In this regard, Jean-Claude Monod (1994) aptly points out that one could hold up against 
Blumenberg’s arguments certain instances of secularization in modern philosophies of 
history, in which the chiliastic theme of the end of history is still present, as is the case, for 
 
8 “The thesis that I intend to argue here begins by agreeing that there is a connection between the modem age and 
Gnosticism, but interprets it in the reverse sense: The modern age is the second overcoming of Gnosticism. A 
presupposition of this thesis is that the first overcoming of Gnosticism, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, was 
unsuccessful” (p. 126). 





example, with Kantian millenarianism (p. 225).10 Löwith, in other words, stresses that 
philosophy of history arose as an answer to the metaphysical problem of evil and should 
thus first and foremost be understood as a variation of theodicy.     
Blumenberg, on the other hand, because he favors an explanation based only upon 
efficient causation, seems unable to grasp Löwith’s point. This is the reason why, in 
addressing his opponent’s theory, he inadvertently jumps from the metaphysical level of 
finality to the purely historical level of efficiency, an argumentative misstep known as 
metábasis eis állo génos. Furthermore, Blumenberg reduces the efficient cause to its 
material type, a fact that restricts his methodology of inquiry: in his relentless demand for 
evidence, he treats ideas as perceivable, quantifiable, and measurable material —much in 
the manner of positivism. He inquires less where modernity tends toward —or what 
modernity ultimately means— than how or wherefrom it emerged. His thought moves along 
the horizontal axis of efficiency. 
Last, Löwith in no way denies that scientific progress started a revolution by itself 
—i.e. independently from the Jewish-Christian tradition— and that such revolution 
“radicalized” history by boosting the idea of its moving forward: “Not only have the 
innovations by natural science accelerated the speed and expanded the range of 
sociohistorical movements and changes, but they have made nature a highly controllable 
element in man’s historical adventure” (p. 194). And he readily accepts that this 
development in science led to the self-understanding of the human exclusively in terms of 
history, as opposed to one based on nature, thus giving predominance to temporality over 
permanence. Löwith’s admission of this fact suggests that, contrary to Blumenberg’s 
“either/or” model, he responds with a “both/and” answer to the question of how the notion 
of progress arose in modernity. The ultimate reason for this variance, I have attempted to 
demonstrate, is that Löwith takes both answers as mutually compatible. 
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Blumenberg, H. (1966). The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp, 
599 pp. 
In the 7th German Congress of Philosophy of 1962 —dedicated to the topic of 
“Progress”— Hans Blumenberg first subjected the concept of secularization to criticism, as 
an explanatory model of philosophy of history designating the progression from a 
religiously grounded to a secularized [verweltlichten] world. Lately, he has taken up again 
the critique of secularization schemes in the first part of a comprehensive historically-
academic book under the title “Critique of a Category of Historical Wrong” —he named the 
third and fourth parts of the work “The trial of theoretical curiosity” and the “The Cusan 
and the Nolan: aspects of the change of epoch,” respectively. The whole book, in turn, is 
entitled The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, since his criticism of the illegitimacy of the 
concept of secularization serves him well to justify “human self-assertion” over against 
“theological absolutism” (part II). Thus, injustice would be done to modernity, if it were 
conceived from the perspective of a secularized [verweltlichen] Christian-theological 
tradition. Despite the author’s departure from the juridical concept of secularization in the 
first line, his main concern is surely the right historical understanding of modernity —but 
his apologetic interest in the original autonomy of modernity’s human self-assertion must 
not be underestimated. Not only does the author want to “understand” the epochal character 
of modernity, but also to rightly assess it, judge it, evaluate it, and vindicate it against an 
alleged injustice. Accordingly, the motto of his book (taken from André Gide’s novel The 
Counterfeiters) reads: “C’est curieux comme le point de vue diffère, suivant qu’on est le 
fruit du crime ou de la légitimité” (Gide, 1973, p. 59).12  
The point of view for the right judgment of the Modern Age, however, could not 
be arbitrarily chosen; rather, it should prove to be the true and right one through historical 
analysis. Contrary to this, the very much used and popularized “secularization model” would 
have its philosophical origin in Hegel’s philosophy of history, insofar as, in sublating the 
Christian-reformed historical phase in the Modern World of bourgeois society, it would 
prove nothing about the origin and specificity of modernity, moreover, it would fail to 
examine the burden of proof: 
 
11 Karl Löwith, Philosophische Rundschau 15 (1968): 195-201. The full review of Blumenberg’s book has two 
parts: the first one by Karl Löwith, which is the one translated here, and the second by Hans Georg Gadamer. 





Thus, for example, Löwith’s World History and Salvation takes for granted the origin of the 
idea of progress and of the philosophy of history based upon it [as rising] purely and simply 
from theological eschatology, without producing any proof of the assertion that the idea of 
progress is a secularized concept of the transcendent hope in a consummation and fulfillment 
at the end of times. Whatever value one attaches to secularization —whether as support of the 
idea of worldly progress or of otherworldly final aims— such value is secondary in relation to 
whether a genetic-historical conditionality exists between them at all. The author disputes this 
conditionality not only in reference to the idea of progress and to the philosophy of history 
based upon it, but also as a general rule and principle. Neither would the modern work ethic 
have anything to do with a secularization of puritan asceticism (M. Weber), nor the future 
kingdom of freedom in the Communist Manifesto with Jewish messianism, nor would 
Descartes’s philosophical aspiration to an absolute scientific certainty replace the religious 
certainty of salvation, nor would the idea of equality of all people before the law secularize 
the belief in the equality of all humans before God, and so on.13  
In all such examples of alleged secularization of religious representations, the 
actual historical succession could not be presented as the self-perseveration of a substance 
alienated from its origin. The first and foremost criterion to determine the legitimacy of the 
talk of secularization would thus be the identity of the expropriated and distorted substance 
in its historical metamorphoses, along with the legitimacy of the primary ownership and, 
finally, the one-sidedness of the dispossession —since the historical explanatory value of 
the category of secularization would be essentially tied to the preservation of a substantial 
moment. This demand for evidence of a self-preserving substance or also just of constants 
in the progress of a historical movement stands, however, in remarkable contrast to the 
author’s rejection of all substantialist philosophy of history. The point of his critique resides 
precisely in the idea that history is no “substance of tradition” and that the establishment of 
alleged constants would imply a surrender of understanding. Since his historical 
consciousness rejects any substantial tradition or basic self-preserving features, yet at the 
same time establishes these as a criterion to demonstrate secularization, the author charges 
his opponent with the burden of proof. Since, he claims, that which, what could be verified 
in the progression from religious to secular manifestations is no identical substance, but 
rather a functional system of positions, which can always be occupied anew, not occupied 
at all, or newly substantiated. 
Only a few instances, in which the author believes he recognizes a true secularization, are 
tackled by his critique. Thus Rousseau’s confessions following the model of Augustine would 
be a “real secularization of transcendent divine judgment into literary self-judgment.” To the 
objection that Rousseau’s confessions are a parody of Augustinian confessions rather than the 
product of secularization (Blumenberg, 1964, pp. 262, 337), the author replies that “precisely” 
the parody character would be the possible consequence of a true secularization. 
 
13 Unless otherwise specified, all indented text cited by Löwith belongs to the first edition of Die Legitimität der 
Neuzeit (1966). Because, unfortunately, I do not have access to this source, my translation is based on the text 





But even if one can assent, within certain limits, to his criticism of a substantial 
ontology of history, who could deny that the legacy of an influential tradition determines all 
relatively new beginnings? (And which heritage has —compared against political 
authorities— remained more effective and more stable throughout two millennia of Western 
history than institutionalized Christianity?) That the idea of progress would have only 
regional meaning and a partial origin, namely in the realms of scientific discoveries and of 
the literary-aesthetic controversies of the 17th century, and that this idea does not touch on 
the question about the meaning and the course of history as such and in general, is as 
improbable as the assertion that the rationality and autonomy of the human in the Modern 
Age are absolutely original and independent. An epoch could only be autonomous if it began 
ex nihilo and not within and in opposition to a historical tradition. The author himself notices 
that, just as it happens with every historical legitimacy, the problem of the legitimacy of the 
Modern Age emerges “from the pretension of this age to accomplish (and to be able to 
accomplish) a radical break with all tradition and from the disproportion between this 
pretense and the reality of history, which can never start entirely anew.” But the crucial 
difference would lie in “whether I can say that the Modern Age should be conceived as a 
result of an age thoroughly determined by theology, which preceded it, even if the relation 
were one of self-assertion and opposition to the predetermination of that which it revolts 
against, or whether I must say that the Modern Age would just be a metamorphosis of the 
theological substance of the Middle Ages and hence nothing different from the derivative 
conceived under the title secularism, altogether thus a Christian heresy.” The latter is 
certainly maintained neither by Hegel’s speculative spiritualization of the Christian 
tradition, nor by Saint-Simon’s socialist interpretation of the New Testament, nor by 
Proudhon’s antitheism, nor by Troeltsch’s studies on The Significance of Protestantism for 
the Rise of the Modern World, nor by H. de Lubac’s The Drama of Human Atheism, nor by 
ourselves, when we discussed the theological implications of the philosophy of history and 
of post-Christian metaphysics in general. Because our thesis, too, said nothing more and 
nothing less than that Old-Testament prophecy and Christian eschatology have created a 
horizon of questions and a spiritual atmosphere —with regard to the philosophy of history, 
a horizon of futurity and of future fulfillment— which has made possible the modern 
concept of history and the worldly faith in progress. The question is: where does this giant 
impulse toward “creative” activity come from? An impulse, that is to say, which urged the 
Christian West to disseminate its civilization over the entire Earth and to enslave foreign 
peoples, by converting them to Christianity: 
Surely, it was not a heathen but a Christian culture that brought about this revolution. The aim 
of modern science —to dominate nature— and the idea of progress emerged neither in the 
Classical world nor in the East, but in the West. But what has this shaping of the world anew 
after the image of man mended for us? Has by any chance the belief in being created in the 
image of a Creator, the hope in a future Kingdom of God, and the Christian commandment to 
annunciate the Gospel to all peoples for their salvation turned into the worldly pretension that 






With these questions we conclude Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen (p. 185 and 
194 n.),14 but by no means with the assertion that the modern world is nothing other than a 
Christian heresy. The possibility and probability that the modern, worldly faith in progress 
would contain assumptions related to the history of salvation is no “useless melancholy” 
seeking after “the remotest responsibilities for the uneasiness felt toward the past.” Nor is it 
at all striking “that everything can result from secularization,” namely variety, oppositions, 
and reversals. 
For the author it is decisive whether the expectation of an end is performed from 
“transcendence,” or whether it is performed from “immanence”: 
There are no signs of the transposition of eschatology into the idea of progress. The decisive 
formal difference is this: eschatology, in itself transcendent and heterogeneous, speaks of an 
event breaking into history; the idea of progress extrapolates from a structure immanent to 
history and coexisting with each present out into the future. 
How does the author know that the idea of the progress of history is “immanent”? 
In the case of Ancient Greece, history is neither immanent nor transcendent, but in the 
philosophy of history conditioned by theology of history it is probably both. The difference 
between immanent and transcendent accomplishments does not contradict the possible 
transposition, or even redeployment, of eschatology into the progress scheme. Since what 
else should “secularization” [Säkularisierung] mean, if not precisely the possibility of 
secularizing [verweltlichen] an originally transcendent relational meaning into one that is 
immanent and thus of alienating its original meaning? The essential feature of both 
immanent and transcendent expectations of an end is that they generally live in hope, by 
thinking of history as directed toward an aim that fulfills them. The epilogue to 
Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen discusses, therefore, what it means to Greeks, on the 
one hand, and to Christians, on the other, to live in hope of the future.  
An indirect proof of the Christian-theological conditioning of the “Modern Age” is 
also that before Christianity there did not and could not exist specifically modern 
representations, ideas, thoughts, and words to designate the natural world, man, and his 
history. The author himself knows that modern anthropology, for example, has expressed 
itself broadly in the theological representation of God as an absolute subject and of man as 
God’s similitude and hence that it adjudicates to man a creative force analogous to God 
(Blumenberg, 1964, p. 262). Even Sartre’s existential atheism cannot help but define the 
negating freedom of man as a creation ex nihilo. It could be no mere accident that Greek 
philosophy conceived of no philosophy of history or of freedom and that Greek historians 
thought about the nature of the human and of history in a completely different way from that 
the one of post-Christian metaphysicians. The event that we call Christendom does not 
constitute an epoch among others, but rather the decisive epoch that separates us from 
 





antiquity. Not until Nietzsche’s anti-Christian perspective do antiquity and Christianity 
move together again as religious-founded societies of ancient times. Modern philosophy 
does not simply “advocate” the function of theology, even and precisely in those cases where 
it knows itself in the sharpest opposition to it; it is itself philosophical theology from 
Descartes’s rational to Hegel’s speculative proof of the existence of God. The “autonomy” 
of “human self-assertion” – whose humanity can be suspected —is no original autonomy 
either— even if one does not construe it theologically as lack of mercy and God-
forsakenness. Rather, that autonomy is still the incomplete outcome of a protracted 
emancipation from religious ties, onto-theological concepts, and theological mortgages. 
Likewise, “theological absolutism” is not simply the wholly other of human self-assertion 
—for the human already since Comte, Feuerbach, and Marx occupies the role and position 
of the absolute, although not any longer as God’s creature and similitude. 
After working through the author’s complex way of thinking and writing, a question 
automatically comes up: why this expenditure of astute reflections, outspread historical 
learning, and polemical points against the scheme of secularization, if the criticism of this 
illegitimate category after all coincides with that which it opposes —even though it does it 
in a sophisticated manner? One can only agree with the author when he designates the idea 
of progress, applied to the meaningful movement of history in its totality, as an attempt to 
fulfill a question that, quasi-abandoned and unsaturated, had remained unsolved, after 
theology had virulently formulated it (p. 35).  
The idea of progress as one of the possible answers to the question about the whole of history 
was involved in the function of consciousness of an already historicized eschatology. It was 
therefore used as an effort for clarification, which overexerted its rationality.   
But the claim that the idea of progress “taken by itself” has risen “totally 
independently” from the theological representation content of eschatology is dubious, 
because the “no longer possible totality” of history belongs so necessarily to the claim of a 
post-Christian philosophy of history, as the history of salvation constructed upon an 
eschatological aim belongs to the history of theology. The author says very aptly (p. 42 ff.):  
The willingness to embrace such a (theological) mortgage of predetermined questions, and to 
carry them as one’s own debts, largely determines the spiritual history of the Modern Age . . . 
But what actually happened in the process interpreted as secularization is not a transposition 
of authentically theological contents into their secular self-alienation, but rather a 
transposition of positions which became vacant of answers, which did not let themselves be 
eliminated in relation to their corresponding questions or whose critical establishment . . . 
lacked the presuppositions and the courage of admitting their insufficiency. 
Even Christianity in its early times stood under a similar “pressure” of issues that 





The Christian reception of antiquity and the so-called modern secularization of Christianity 
are structurally and functionally broadly analogous historical phenomena: patristic 
Christianity arose in the role of ancient philosophy; to a great extent modern philosophy 
stepped in for the function of theology. 
Questions do not always precede their answers; there is ‘spontaneous generation’ of great . . . 
assertions of the type of eschatological expectancy, of creationism, or of the doctrine of 
original sin, all of which by the dwindling of their credibility and worth . . . only leave behind 
similarly great questions, for which thus a new answer is due —if and because it does not 
succeed in critically destroying the question itself and in undertaking amputations in the 
system of world explanation. (p. 43)     
The juristic concept of secularization, which the author takes as his starting point 
and to which alone legitimacy or illegitimacy can rightfully be awarded, has a specific and 
limited realm of application, because it refers to verifiable property relations. In a transposed 
sense, applied to historical ages, no speech can properly be about legitimacy or illegitimacy, 
since in the history of representations, ideas, and thoughts it extends so broadly as the power 
of appropriating and transforming a tradition. The respective results of such a transformed 
appropriation cannot be reckoned up as positive or negative according to an authentic 
ownership. The author fails to recognize that in the history of political or other kind of events 
results are never closed and that they are always something different from what was intended 
and expected by the originators of a new age. The births of historical lives are all of them 
“illegitimate.” And the origin of a multiply conditioned and widely ramified historical 
phenomenon can be “verified” as little as it can be assessed with certainty whether the 
putative father of a child is the real one. 
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